Which Rules Rather than Discretion in a Democracy? An Axiomatic Approach
Year of publication: |
1991-04
|
---|---|
Authors: | Cohen, Daniel ; Michel, Philippe |
Institutions: | C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers |
Subject: | Credibility | Macroeconomic Policy | Time Inconsistency |
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