Who benefits from partial tax coordination?
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Han, Yutao |
Institutions: | Centre de Recherche en Économie Appliquée (CREA), Faculté de droit, d'économie et de finance |
Subject: | Tax competition | infrastructure competition | partial tax coordination | social welfare |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Classification: | H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; H87 - International Fiscal Issues ; H73 - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects ; F21 - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements ; C72 - Noncooperative Games |
Source: |
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On the desirability of tax coordination when countries compete in taxes and infrastructures
Han, Yutao, (2013)
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On the desirability of tax coordination when countries compete in taxes and infrastructure
Han, Yutao, (2013)
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On the desirability of tax coordination when countries compete in taxes and infrastructure
Han, Yutao, (2013)
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On the desirability of tax coordination when countries compete in taxes and infrastructures
Han, Yutao, (2013)
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The Dynamics of the Location of Firms – A Revisit of Home-Attachment under Tax Competition
Han, Yutao, (2013)
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Asymmetric Competition among Nation States. A differential game approach
Han, Yutao, (2011)
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