Who benefits from ratepayer-funded auctions of transmission congestion contracts? : evidence from New York
Gordon W. Leslie
| Year of publication: |
2021
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Leslie, Gordon W. |
| Published in: |
Energy economics. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0140-9883, ZDB-ID 795279-X. - Vol. 93.2021, p. 1-21
|
| Subject: | New York | Auktion | Auction | Engpass | Bottleneck | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Vertrag | Contract |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.eneco.2020.105025 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012631198