Who gains from information asymmetry?
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Epstein, Gil S. ; Mealem, Yosef |
Published in: |
Theory and decision : an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision science. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0040-5833, ZDB-ID 189247-2. - Vol. 75.2013, 3, p. 305-337
|
Subject: | Asymmetric contests | Rent seeking | Incomplete information | Theorie | Theory | Rent-Seeking | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Unvollkommene Information |
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