Who's to Blame for Greece? : Life After Bankruptcy: Between Optimism and Substandard Growth

1. Introduction -- Part I. The “Party Period” Before the Crisis -- 2. The Costs and Benefits for Joining a Common Currency with Emphasis on Weaker Member States: The Pre-crisis Debate -- 3. Greece Before the Crisis: The Critical Years in Domestic Politics -- 4. IMF and EU Reports on Greece -- Part II Greece’s Free Fall 2010–2013 -- 5. The Troika Period Reconsidered -- 6. Assessing the Intentions of the Government(s) Since the Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty -- Part III. Looking Ahead -- 7. Greece: Why Did the Forceful Internal Devaluation Fail to Kick-Start an Export-Led Growth? -- 8. Giving Greece a Chance to Succeed: Think About the Private Sector, for a Change -- 9. Structural Differences Ensure Permanent Shock Trends That Play into the Above. A Closer and More Democratic Union to Heal Economic Asymmetries and Help Southern European Countries Such as Greece -- Part IV. How Populism (2015–2017) Destroyed a Country with High Potential -- 10. The Rise of Populism in Greece and the Impact on the Economy -- 11. Latest Developments as of December 2017 Developments -- 12. Conclusions -- Part V. Life After Bankruptcy: Between Optimism and Substandard Growth -- 13. How “More Europe” Can Heal the Current Institutional Divergence Hurting in Particular Weaker Member States Like Greece -- 14. From Viking Kleptocratic Pressure Groups to State Capture Through Populism: Buying Votes Through Rent Seeking Clientelistic Partitocracy -- 15. In Defense of Manufacturing -- 16. Greece’s Comparative Advantage as China’s Backdoor to Europe -- 17. Taxing Ourselves to Death: Greece’s Tax Regulations -- 18. How to Finance a Tax Wedge Cut in a Way That Supports Work and Families -- 19. The Greek Economy After Populism: Between Optimism and Substandard Growth -- 20. Final Remarks.