Who to pay for performance? : the choice of organisational level for hospital performance incentives
Year of publication: |
May 2016
|
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Authors: | Kristensen, Søren Rud ; Bech, Mickael ; Lauridsen, Jørgen |
Published in: |
The European journal of health economics : HEPAC ; health economics in prevention and care. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1618-7598, ZDB-ID 2045253-6. - Vol. 17.2016, 4, p. 435-442
|
Subject: | Pay for performance | Hospital incentives | Incentive design | Team production | Krankenhaus | Hospital | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Anreiz | Incentives | Dienstleistungsqualität | Service quality |
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