Why an informed principal may leave rents to an agent
Year of publication: |
1994
|
---|---|
Authors: | Beaudry, Paul |
Published in: |
International economic review. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0020-6598, ZDB-ID 209871-4. - Vol. 35.1994, 4, p. 821-832
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Implizite Kontrakte | Implicit contracts | Theorie | Theory |
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