Why Can Modern Governments Tax so Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Kleven, Henrik |
Other Persons: | Kreiner, Claus Thustrup (contributor) ; Saez, Emmanuel (contributor) |
Publisher: |
[2010]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Steuervermeidung | Tax avoidance | Unternehmensbesteuerung | Corporate taxation | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (51 p) |
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Series: | NBER Working Paper ; No. w15218 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 2009 erstellt |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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