Why do banks hold capital in excess of regulatory requirements? A functional approach
Year of publication: |
2004
|
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Authors: | Dietrich, Diemo ; Vollmer, Uwe |
Publisher: |
Halle (Saale) : Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH) |
Subject: | Bank | Kapitalstruktur | Eigenkapitalvorschriften | Kreditgeschäft | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Verhandlungstheorie | Theorie | incomplete contracts | minimum capital requirements | bank capital | disintermediation | pro-cyclicality |
Series: | IWH Discussion Papers ; 192/2004 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 391530119 [GVK] hdl:10419/23729 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:iwhdps:iwh-192 [RePEc] |
Classification: | G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages ; G28 - Government Policy and Regulation |
Source: |
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Why do banks hold capital in excess of regulatory requirements? A functional approach
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