Why do banks promise to pay par on demand?
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Dwyer Jr., Gerald P. ; Samartín, Margarita |
Publisher: |
Atlanta, GA : Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta |
Subject: | Bankenkrise | Einlagensicherung | Bankgeschichte | Geldmarktfonds | Welt | banking panics | suspension of payments | banking history |
Series: | Working Paper ; 2006-26 |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 572293283 [GVK] hdl:10419/70661 [Handle] |
Classification: | G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages ; E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking and the Supply of Money and Credit |
Source: |
-
Why do banks promise to pay par on demand?
Dwyer, Gerald P. <jun.>, (2006)
-
Theoretical explanations of why banks promise to pay par on demand
Dwyer, Gerald P. <jun.>, (2006)
-
Why do banks promise to pay par on demand?
Dwyer, Gerald P. <jun.>, (2009)
- More ...
-
Why do banks promise to pay par on demand?
Dwyer Jr., Gerald P., (2009)
-
The effects of the ECB’s unconventional monetary policies from 2011 to 2018 on banking assets
Dwyer, Gerald P.,
-
The role of demand deposit in risk sharing
Samartín, Margarita, (1998)
- More ...