Why do borrowers pledge collateral? : new empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information
Year of publication: |
2011
|
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Authors: | Berger, Allen N. ; Espinosa-Vega, Marco A. ; Frame, W. Scott ; Miller, Nathan H. |
Published in: |
Journal of financial intermediation. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1042-9573, ZDB-ID 1053781-8. - Vol. 20.2011, 1, p. 55-70
|
Subject: | Kreditsicherung | Collateral | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Kreditrationierung | Credit rationing | KMU | SME | Kreditwürdigkeit | Credit rating | USA | United States |
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