Why do CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations?
This paper examines why CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations. We find that while CFOs bear substantial legal costs when involved in accounting manipulations, these CFOs have similar equity incentives to the CFOs of matched non-manipulation firms. In contrast, CEOs of manipulation firms have higher equity incentives and more power than CEOs of matched firms. Taken together, our findings are consistent with the explanation that CFOs are involved in material accounting manipulations because they succumb to pressure from CEOs, rather than because they seek immediate personal financial benefit from their equity incentives. AAER content analysis reinforces this conclusion.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Feng, Mei ; Ge, Weili ; Luo, Shuqing ; Shevlin, Terry |
Published in: |
Journal of Accounting and Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4101. - Vol. 51.2011, 1-2, p. 21-36
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Earnings quality Accounting manipulation CFO turnover CEO power Incentive compensation |
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