Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors?
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger ; Low, Angie ; Stulz, René M. |
Published in: |
Journal of financial economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-405X, ZDB-ID 187118-3. - Vol. 97.2010, 1, p. 12-32
|
Subject: | Vorstand | Executive board | Führungskräfteauswahl | Executive selection | Theorie | Theory |
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