Why do policy makers give (permanent) power to policy advisers?
Year of publication: |
2001
|
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Authors: | Swank, Otto H. ; Dur, Robert A. J. |
Published in: |
Economics & politics. - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0954-1985, ZDB-ID 1002943-6. - Vol. 13.2001, 1, p. 73-94
|
Subject: | Politikberatung | Policy advice | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
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