Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?
Year of publication: |
2008-03-10
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Authors: | Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Hellström, Jörgen ; Landström, Mats |
Institutions: | Institutionen för Nationalekonomi, Umeå Universitet |
Subject: | Institutional reforms | inflation | time-inconsistency | political stability | probit |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series Umeå Economic Studies Number 733 34 pages |
Classification: | E31 - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation ; E42 - Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System ; E52 - Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects) ; E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies |
Source: |
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