Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kesten, Onur |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 144.2009, 5, p. 2209-2226
|
Subject: | Unteilbare Güter | Indivisible goods | Allokation | Allocation | Theorie | Theory |
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