Why do reputable agents work for safer firms?
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Li, Fei ; Ueda, Masako |
Published in: |
Finance research letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1544-6123, ZDB-ID 2181386-3. - Vol. 6.2009, 1, p. 2-12
|
Subject: | Risikokapital | Venture capital | Investmentbank | Investment bank | Reputation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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