Why Event Studies Do Not Detect Anti-Competitive Mergers

Anticompetitive mergers increase competitors' profits, since they reduce competition. Using a model of endogenous mergers, we show that such mergers nevertheless may reduce the competitors' share-prices. Thus, event-studies can not detect anti-competitive mergers.

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Year of publication:	2000-12-14
Authors:	Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof ; Stennek, Johan
Institutions:	Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN)
Subject:	Mergers & Acquisitions \| Event Studies \| Antitrust \| Coalition Formation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Working Paper Series Number 542 8 pages
Classification:	G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645370