Why Every Economist Should Learn some Auction Theory
| Year of publication: |
2000-07-01
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Klemperer, Paul |
| Institutions: | Department of Economics, Oxford University |
| Subject: | Auctions | Bidding | Auction Theory | Private Values | Common Values | Mechanism Design | Litigation | Stock Markets | Queues | Financial Crashes | Brand Loyalty | War of Attrition | Bertrand | Perfect Competition | E-Commerce | Spectrum Auctions | Treasury Auctions | Electricity |
| Extent: | application/pdf |
|---|---|
| Series: | |
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Notes: | Number 2000-W25 |
| Classification: | D44 - Auctions ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; K41 - Litigation Process ; L96 - Telecommunications ; L94 - Electric Utilities ; D42 - Monopoly ; D45 - Rationing; Licensing ; G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies ; L81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade; Warehousing |
| Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604844