Why executive power centralizes government
Year of publication: |
2005
|
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Authors: | Baker, Samuel H. |
Published in: |
Public finance review : PFR. - Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage, ISSN 1091-1421, ZDB-ID 1358400-5. - Vol. 33.2005, 6, p. 747-766
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Subject: | Föderalismus | Federalism | Politische Partei | Political party | Macht | Power | Regierung | Government | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Theorie | Theory | Veto | USA | United States | 1982-1992 |
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