Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests
Year of publication: |
2005-03-22
|
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Authors: | Kawagoe, Toshiji ; Takizawa, Hirokazu |
Institutions: | EconWPA |
Subject: | Cheap talk | Communication | Private information | Experiment | Equilibrium refinement | Bounded rationality | Truth bias |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Type of Document - pdf; pages: 41 41 pages |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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