Why Patent Hold-Up Does Not Violate Antitrust Law
Year of publication: |
2018
|
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Authors: | Werden, Gregory J. ; Froeb, Luke M. |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Kartellrecht | Antitrust law | Patent | Patentrecht | Patent law | Wettbewerbspolitik | Competition policy | Innovation | Theorie | Theory |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (34 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 4, 2018 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.3244425 [DOI] |
Classification: | K21 - Antitrust Law ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; O34 - Intellectual Property Rights: National and International Issues |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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