Why Principals Tolerate Biases of Inaccurate Agents
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Terai, Kimiko ; Glazer, Amihai |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Systematischer Fehler | Bias | Verhalten | Behaviour |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (15 p) |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: Economics & Politics, Vol. 31, Issue 1, pp. 97-111, 2019 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 2019 erstellt |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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