Why the rich may favor protection of property rights
Year of publication: |
2003
|
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Authors: | Sonin, Konstantin |
Published in: |
Journal of comparative economics : the journal of the Association for Comparative Economic Studies. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0147-5967, ZDB-ID 715350-8. - Vol. 31.2003, 4, p. 715-731
|
Subject: | Vermögen | Wealth | Sachenrecht | Law of property | Rent-Seeking | Rent seeking | Neue Institutionenökonomik | New institutional economics | Theorie | Theory |
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