Why were workers whipped? : pain in a principal-agent model
Year of publication: |
1990
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chwe, Michael Suk-young |
Published in: |
The economic journal : the journal of the Royal Economic Society. - Oxford : Oxford University Press, ISSN 1468-0297, ZDB-ID 3025-9. - Vol. 100.1990, 403, p. 1109-1121
|
Subject: | Strafe | Punishment | Anreiz | Incentives | Theorie | Theory |
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