With a little help from my enemy: comparative advertising as a signal of quality

We extend the theory of advertising as a quality signal, using a model where an entrant can choose to advertise by comparing its product to that of an established incumbent. Comparative advertising, comparing quality of one’s own product to that of a rival’s, empowers the latter to file for court intervention if it believes the comparison to be false or misleading. We show that comparative advertising can be a signal in instances where generic advertising is not viable.

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Year of publication:	2008-10-16
Authors:	BARIGOZZI, Francesca ; GARELLA, Paolo Giorgio ; PEITZ, Martin
Institutions:	Dipartimento di Economia, Management e Metodi Quantitativi (DEMM), Università degli Studi di Milano
Subject:	Advertising \| Quality \| signaling \| Entry \| Competition

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Departmental Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; M37 - Advertising ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005007232