With additional enforcement mechanisms, does Collateral avoid Ponzi Schemes ?
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Revil, Thiago ; Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo |
Publisher: |
Rio de Janeiro : Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia |
Subject: | Effective default enforcements | Collateral repossession | Individual’s optimality. |
Series: | Texto para discussão ; 545 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 539523151 [GVK] hdl:10419/176028 [Handle] RePEc:rio:texdis:545 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D50 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium. General ; D52 - Incomplete Markets |
Source: |
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