Worker or shirker: Who evades more taxes?. A real effort experiment

With the help of a real effort experiment, we analyze if tax evasion depends on the amount of effort invested to generate income. In three treatments, subjects were either endowed with income or had to work moderately or hard to earn it. In line with prospect theory, subjects evaded more taxes when they worked hard for their income. We find little evidence for the prediction that tax evasion in the endowed treatment is higher than in the moderate work treatment.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Bühren, Christoph ; Kundt, Thorben
Publisher:	Marburg : Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
Subject:	tax evasion \| prospect theory \| house money effect \| sunk cost effect \| real effort experiment

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Series:	MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; 26-2013
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	746847319 [GVK] hdl:10419/93509 [Handle] RePEc:mar:MAGKSE:201326 [RePEc]
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles ; H26 - Tax Evasion
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333489