X-Efficiency: Theory, Evidence and Applications

1. Introduction -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. X- and allocative efficiency, and the welfare losses from monopoly power -- 1.3. X-efficiency, and the neoclassical production and cost functions -- 1.4. The development of XE theory -- 1.5. XE theory and generalized neoclassical theory. -- 1.6. XE theory as a research design -- 1.7. Empirical research on XE theory -- 1.8. Critics of XE theory -- 2. Production, cost, and welfare: A review -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. The firm in the short run -- 2.3. The firm in the long run -- 2.4. Firms, markets, and efficiency -- 2.5. Implications -- Appendix: Regulation theory and X-efficiency -- 3. X-efficiency: The intellectual setting and an introduction to the theory -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. Complex objective functions -- 3.3. XE theory: An introduction -- 3.4. Conclusions -- 4. X-efficiency theory: 1 -- 4.1. Introduction -- 4.2. The individual in XE theory -- 4.3. Individual effort and the inert area -- 4.4. Conclusions -- 5. X-efficiency theory: 2 -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. Intrafirm determinants of individual and group effort -- 5.3. Productivity, effort conventions, and the prisoner’s dilemma -- 5.4. Market structure, pressure, and effort -- 5.5. A synthesis and an illustration -- 5.6. Implications and conclusions -- Appendix: Regulation and X-efficiency -- 6. Empirical evidence: Regulated industries -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. Electric Utilities -- 6.3. Local government services -- 6.4. Symphony orchestras -- 6.5. Airlines -- 6.6. Conclusions -- 7. Empirical evidence: Ownership form -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.2. Owner- versus manager-controlled firms -- 7.3. Public versus private ownership -- 7.4. Conclusions -- 8. Empirical evidence: Market structure -- 8.1. Introduction -- 8.2. Output and input ratios -- 8.3. Profits and X-efficiency -- 8.4. Price-fixing behavior -- 8.5. Conclusions -- 9. X-efficiency, its critics, and a reply -- 9.1. Introduction -- 9.2. Rent-seeking -- 9.3. Leisure as output -- 9.4. Management utility under competition -- 9.5. Property rights -- 9.6. Some general comments -- 10. Implications and conclusions -- 10.1. X- and Allocative Efficiency -- 10.2. X-efficiency theory as a research design -- 10.3. X-efficiency and its critics -- 10.4. X-efficiency theory and neoclassical theory: Some final thoughts -- References.