X-Games

What is common to the following situations: incentivizing collective action in the presence of social preferences, monopoly pricing when consumers are loss averse, arms races when players are privately informed of their armament costs? We present a simple formalism, called X-games, which unifies these situations as well as others, and use it to unify and extend the separate analyses that they received in the literature.

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Year of publication:	2014-02
Authors:	Eliaz, Kfir ; Spiegler, Ran
Institutions:	C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Subject:	Contagion \| Coordination \| Externalities \| Strategic complementarities

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CEPR Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 9814
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084519