Zur Reform des Rating-(Un)Wesens. Bestandsaufnahme und eine Reform-Option
The market for ratings suffers from several inefficiencies: asymmetric information and moral hazard lead to conflicts of interest and principal-agent-problems. Moreover, network externalities and economies of scale lead to a lack of competition in the market for ratings. There is empirical evidence for market inefficiencies as ratingshopping, herding or slow adjustment of wrong ratings to a changed environment. As a remedy for these problems, we suggest a fund where rating-orders are pooled and rated by means of a double-blind-approach. Each issuer of a security gives his product into a pool and rating agencies which meet the standards of the pool are free to tender for the mandate to rate the product. Several aspects how to set up such a pool and possible problems are being addressed in this paper.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Beck, Hanno ; Wienert, Helmut |
Published in: |
Review of Economics. - Lucius & Lucius, ISSN 0948-5139. - Vol. 61.2010, 1, p. 45-67
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Publisher: |
Lucius & Lucius |
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