This paper applies ideas from mechanism design to model procurement of prescription drugs. We present a mechanism for government-funded market-driven drug procurement that achieves very close to full static efficiency -- all members have access to all but at most a single drug -- without...

This paper applies ideas from mechanism design to model procurement of prescription drugs. We present a mechanism for government-funded market-driven drug procurement that achieves very close to full static efficiency -- all members have access to all but at most a single drug -- without...

We study the repeated two-player Prisoners' Dilemma with imperfect private monitoring and no communication. Letting the discount factor go to one and holding the monitoring structure fixed, we achieve asymptotic efficiency. Unlike previous works on private monitoring, which have confined...

This paper applies ideas from mechanism design to model procurement of prescription drugs. We present a mechanism for government-funded market-driven drug procurement that achieves very close to full static efficiency -- all members have access to all but at most a single drug -- without...

We consider settings in which skilled experts have private, heterogeneous types. Contracts that evaluate experts based on outcomes are used to differentiate between types. However, experts can take unobservable actions to manipulate their outcomes, which may harm consumers. For example, surgeons...