We use an experiment to examine escalation bias in subjective performance evaluations. Participants assume the role of manager and evaluate the performance of an employee based on a balanced scorecard-type performance report. We manipulate whether managers recommended positively or negatively...

A large stream of work on relative performance evaluation highlights the benefits of using information about peer performance in contracting. In contrast, the potential costs of discouraging cooperation among peers have received much less attention. The purpose of our study is to examine how the...

We conduct a laboratory experiment to examine whether the provision of detailed relative performance information (i.e., information about the specific performance levels of peers) affects employee performance. We also investigate how – if at all – explicit ranking of performance levels...

Prior research has shown that managers tend to compress ratings when subjectively evaluating employees and that such compression can have negative organizational consequences. We reason that organizations can use the design of their control system to influence the personal costs and benefits...

A large stream of work on relative performance evaluation highlights the benefits of using information about peer performance in contracting. In contrast, the potential costs of discouraging cooperation among peers have received much less attention. The purpose of our study is to examine how the...