Search Results - person:"Sémirat, Stéphan"

Bravard, Christophe; Durieu, Jacques; Sarangi, Sudipta; … - 2021

We study the transmission of messages in social networks in the presence of biased and unbiasedagents. Biased agents prefer a specific outcome while unbiased agents prefer the true state of the world. Each agent who receives a message knows the identity (but not the type) of the person from whom...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013225908

False information from near and far

Bravard, Christophe; Durieu, Jacques; Sarangi, Sudipta; … - In: Games and economic behavior 137 (2023), pp. 152-174

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013550964

Strategic information transmission with sender's approval : the single-crossing case

Sémirat, Stéphan; Forges, Françoise - In: Games and economic behavior 134 (2022), pp. 242-263

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013341477

Strategic information transmission despite conflict

Sémirat, Stéphan - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 48 (2019) 3, pp. 921-956

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012311264

Skewed information transmission : the effect of complementarities in a multi-dimensional cheap talk game

Sémirat, Stéphan - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 161 (2019), pp. 1-19

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012140150