Strategic information transmission with sender's approval : the single-crossing case
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sémirat, Stéphan ; Forges, Françoise |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 134.2022, p. 242-263
|
Subject: | Discrete cheap talk | Participation constraints | Single-crossing | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Kommunikation | Communication | Informationsverbreitung | Information dissemination | Signalling |
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