In this work, I study the question of whether social preferences are likely to be game specific or not. While theoretical models typically assume universal preference parameters valid across multiple domains, indirect evolutionary models support diverse parameters especially across the dictator,...

A within-subject designed experiment with six games and a total of seven choices is used to test the hypothesis of consistency of other-regarding motives. By the large number of choices, which are mostly belief-independent, one can test the hypothesis that social preferences have a consistent...

Preferences for reciprocity of the Falk-Fischbacher type are applied to a game of trust. After deriving the reciprocity equilibrium, the evolution of preferences is analysed showing that a medium level of reciprocity is evolutionary stable. If players exhibit different inclinations regarding...

In this paper, an indirect evolutionary version of the game of trust is studied. A population consisting of trustworthy and exploitive players is assumed. Players are chosen randomly from the population and are matched with either strangers or players they know in order to play the game of...

I study the evolution of reciprocity in a gift-exchange game. In equilibrium, wage offers induce maximal effort but there is strong inequity in favor of the workers. The result suggests that norm-based efficiency wages may be unstable over time.