We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players prefer to coordinate on different actions. Players can pay a cost to learn their opponent's group: if they pay it, they can condition their actions concerning the groups. We assess the stability...

We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players prefer to coordinate on different actions. Players can pay a cost to learn their opponent’s group: if they pay it, they can condition their actions concerning the groups. We assess the...

This paper studies the choice of an individual who acquires information before choosing an action froma set of actions,whose consequences depend on the realization of a state of nature. Information processing can be costly, for example, due to limited attention. We show that the preference of...

I show that in a setting with costly information processing, strategic complementarity in pricing, by generating planning complementatrities, results in the aggregate price responding slowly to nominal shocks even though individual firm prices change by large amounts in response to idiosyncratic...