Search Results - subject:"Deferred acceptance algorithm"

Two-Sided Matchings: An Algorithm for Ensuring They Are Minimax and Pareto-Optimal

Steven, Brams; Marc, Kilgour - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed the deferred-acceptance algorithm for matching (i) college applicants and colleges and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109567

New necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation

Mizukami, Hideki; Wakayama, Takuma - In: Economics letters 152 (2017), pp. 76-78

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011801169

The Blocking Lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings

Jiao, Zhenhua; Tian, Guoqiang - In: Games and economic behavior 102 (2017), pp. 44-55

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011792069

Passively-strictly strong Nash equilibrium in a preference revelation game under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm

Li, Chengyue; Inohara, Takehiro; Kitamura, Masahito - In: Theoretical economics letters 7 (2017) 5, pp. 1244-1254

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011748684

Epsilon-stability in school choice

Huang, Chao; Tang, Qianfeng; Wang, Ziwei - In: Social choice and welfare 49 (2017) 2, pp. 277-286

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011898537

Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism

Cantala, David; Pereyra, Juan - In: Review of economic design : RED 21 (2017) 1, pp. 49-63

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011900103

Single versus multiple randomization in matching mechanisms

Schmelzer, André - In: Essays on market design and regulation under bounded …, (pp. 1-30). 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011900999

A dynamic school choice model

Pereyra, Juan Sebastián - Centro de Estudios Económicos, Colegio de México - 2011

acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley. We also show that the mechanism is dynamic strategy-proof, and respects improvements … introduced. It is then proved that a fair matching always exists and that it can be reached by a modified version of the deferred …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009643399

Object allocation via deferred-acceptance : strategy-proofness and comparative statics

Ehlers, Lars H.; Klaus, Bettina - In: Games and economic behavior 97 (2016), pp. 128-146

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771341

Limit your applications : dealing with congested markets in the matching procedure

Balter, Janine; Rancan, Michela; Senyuta, Olena - In: International journal of computational economics and … 6 (2016) 4, pp. 413-431

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704742

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