model to bargained airport landing fees where a number of interesting policy questions have arisen. For example, what is the … (Bertrand competition, uniform landing fees and undifferentiated goods) will lower fees pass through to consumers. (c) With … Cournot competition, uniform landing fees are always higher than discriminatory fees, while the reverse is true with Bertrand …

A number of interesting policy questions have arisen regarding airport landing fees. For example, what is the impact of … countervailing power, via an increase in downstream concentration, lowers landing fees, but typically does not pass through to … consumers; (c) with Cournot competition, uniform landing fees are always higher than discriminatory fees. …

model to airport landing fees where a number of interesting policy questions have arisen. For example, what is the impact of … countervailing power, via an increase in downstream concentration, typically lowers landing fees, but depends on the competition … downstream competition is in quantities, but if downstream competition is in prices landing fees fall only where airports cannot …

landing fees, which reflects the overall costs that air transport operators impose on others. Airport pricing should provide a …