We study the role of traders' meeting capacities in decentralized markets with adverse selection. Uninformed customers choose trading mechanisms in order to find a provider for a service. Providers are privately informed about their quality and aim to match with one of the customers. We consider...

In this study, we investigate an optimal consumption and investment problem of an economic agent who faces a welfare constraint; the agent does not accept her expected utility (continuation value) falls below a certain fixed level regardless of the time and state. This optimization problem...

We study physician agency and optimal payment policy in the context of an expensive medication used in dialysis care. Using Medicare claims data we estimate a structural model of treatment decisions, in which physicians differ in their altruism and marginal costs, and this heterogeneity is...

This research aims to develop a determinant variable of the Sukuk rating derived from agency and asymmetry theories. This research is essential because Sukuk or Islamic Bonds is needed in Indonesia, with 85% of its population out of 320 million people being Muslim. Many studies on the...

This paper studies an informed mechanism designer problem in which the principal’s private information is a number of agents. We define mechanical equivalence such that it holds if each agent’s and the principal’s perspectives are consistent in the sense that a conversion problem for a...