This paper considers general games in which multiple informed principals simultaneously compete to influence the decisions of a common agent. It shows that we can characterize all outcomes of any game in which principals delegate the final decisions to the agent using arbitrary mechanisms, by...

In common agency games, one cannot characterize all equilibria by considering only direct mechanisms. In an attempt to overcome this difficulty, Peters [Econometrica, 2001]and Martimort and Stole [Econometrica, 2002] identified a class of indirect mechanisms (namely, menus) which are able to...

In this note, we argue that in Common Agency games the restriction todeterministic menus is critical. We give an simple example, with complete information and no moral hazard,where an equilibrium is not robust to the introduction of stochastic menus.

In this note, we argue that in Common Agency games the restriction todeterministic menus is critical. We give an simple example, with complete information and no moral hazard,where an equilibrium is not robust to the introduction of stochastic menus.