In the United States, electoral districts must be equipopulous. This requirement is known as the one man one vote doctrine. We propose welfare-based justifications for this requirement under the economic view, according to which voters care about the policy, and under the political view,...

This paper introduces a new storable vote mechanism (storable votes, pay-as-you-win-mechanism, SV-PAYW) where a fixed number of votes can be cast among different alternatives, and the votes spent (and redistributed) on each election depend only on the number cast for the wining alternative. The...

This research project investigates whether one of the purported benefits of Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) – an expanded candidate pool – has been realized in the cities where it has been implemented. Employing a difference-in-differences approach with matching, I find that any increase in the...

We show using a theoretical framework that embeds a voting model in a general-equilibrium model of a rural economy with two interest groups defined by land ownership that the effects of democratization--a shift from control of public resources by the landed elite to a democratic regime with...

We study the effect on the participation rate of employing different voting rules in the context of the problem to allocate a fixed monetary budget to two different public projects. Specifically, we compare the mean rule according to which the average of the individually proposed allocations is...