The new training literature suggests that in a monopsonistic market employers will not only pay for firm-specific training but also for general training if the risk of poaching is limited. This implies that training participation should decrease when competition for employees is higher among...

Using the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), this paper investigates the determinants of training participation in Germany, distinguishing between self-initiated and employer-initiated training. Self-initiated training is considered as being a decision within households rather than purely individual....

This paper addresses the question to which extent the complementarity between education and training can be attributed to differences in observable characteristics, i.e. to individual, job and firm specific characteristics. The novelty of this paper is to analyze previously unconsidered...

This paper uses firm level panel data of firm provided training to estimate its impact on productivity and wages. To this end the strategy proposed by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) for estimating production functions to control for the endogeneity of input factors and training is applied....

The paper examines the extent of apprenticeships in the first job for a cohort of young men entering the labour market at age 16 in the late 1970s. The impact of the apprenticeship on employment duration and early labour market mobility is estimated. The data set used is the National Child...

Using longitudinal data from the British National Child Development Study, this paper examines gender differences in the determinants of work-related training. The analysis covers a crucial decade in the working lives of the 1958 birth cohort of young men and women – the years spanning the...

Using data from the National Educational Panel Study of 2009/2010, this paper investigates the relationship between regional training supply and employees’ training participation. Controlling for other regional factors such as the local unemployment rate, the educational level, the population...

The paper examines the optimal level of training investment when trained workers are mobile, wage contracts are time-consistent, and training comprises both specific and general skills. It is shown that, in the absence of a social planner, the firm has ex-post monopsonistic power that drives...

This paper offers and tests a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for general training they receive. The crucial ingredient in our model is that the current employer has superior information about the worker’s ability relative to other firms. This informational advantage gives the...