Showing 1 - 10 of 14
We examine CEO-board dynamics using a new panel dataset that spans 1920 to 2011. The long sample allows us to perform within-firm and within-CEO tests over a long horizon, many for the first time in the governance literature. Consistent with theories of bargaining or dynamic contracting, we find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479953
Using a unique 10-year panel that includes more than 13,300 expected stock market return probability distributions, we find that executives are severely miscalibrated, producing distributions that are too narrow: realized market returns are within the executives' 80% confidence intervals only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462440
We conduct beauty contest experiments, using close to 2,000 subjects to study the facial traits of CEOs. In one experiment we use pairs of photographs and find that subjects rate CEO faces as appearing more "competent" and less "likable" than non-CEO faces. Another experiment matches CEOs from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462745
Miscalibration is a standard measure of overconfidence in both psychology and economics. Although it is often used in lab experiments, there is scarcity of evidence about its effects in practice. We test whether top corporate executives are miscalibrated, and whether their miscalibration impacts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464935
We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality -- the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power -- and the value and behavior of public firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five compensation captured...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464945
While prior empirical work and much public attention have focused on the opportunistic timing of executives' grants, we provide in this paper evidence that outside directors' option grants have also been favorably timed to an extent that cannot be fully explained by sheer luck. Examining events...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465848
We study the relation between corporate governance and opportunistic timing of CEO option grants via backdating or otherwise. Our methodology focuses on how grant date prices rank within the price distribution of the grant month. During 1996-2005, about 12% of firms provided one or more lucky...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465890
Because public firms are not required to disclose the monetary value of pension plans in their executive pay disclosures, financial economists have generally analyzed executive pay using figures that do not include the value of such pension plans. This paper presents evidence that omitting the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466764
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468885
factors that drive dividend and share repurchase policies. We find that managers are very reluctant to cut dividends, that … repurchases is viewed by managers as being more flexible than using dividends, permitting a better opportunity to optimize … investment. Managers like to repurchase shares when they feel their stock is undervalued and in an effort to affect EPS. Dividend …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469041