Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Year of publication: |
July 2003
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bebchuk, Lucian Arye |
Other Persons: | Fried, Jesse M. (contributor) |
Institutions: | National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor) |
Publisher: |
Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research |
Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Gerechtigkeit | Justice | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
---|---|
Series: | NBER working paper series ; no. w9813 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Mode of access: World Wide Web System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers. |
Other identifiers: | 10.3386/w9813 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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