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Hall, Brian J. - 2000

Over the past 20 years, there has been a dramatic increase in the share of executive compensation paid through stock options. In this paper, we examine the extent to which tax policy has influenced the composition of executive compensation, and discuss the implications of rising stock-based pay...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471173

Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options

Hall, Brian J. - 2000

Although exercise prices for executive stock options can be set either below or above the grant-date market price, in practice virtually all options are granted at the money. We offer an economic rationale for this apparent puzzle, by showing that pay-to-performance incentives for risk-averse...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471227

CEO Centrality

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2007

We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality -- the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power -- and the value and behavior of public firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five compensation captured...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464945

Lucky Directors

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2006

While prior empirical work and much public attention have focused on the opportunistic timing of executives' grants, we provide in this paper evidence that outside directors' option grants have also been favorably timed to an extent that cannot be fully explained by sheer luck. Examining events...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465848

Lucky CEOs

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2006

We study the relation between corporate governance and opportunistic timing of CEO option grants via backdating or otherwise. Our methodology focuses on how grant date prices rank within the price distribution of the grant month. During 1996-2005, about 12% of firms provided one or more lucky...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465890

Executive Pensions

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2005

Because public firms are not required to disclose the monetary value of pension plans in their executive pay disclosures, financial economists have generally analyzed executive pay using figures that do not include the value of such pension plans. This paper presents evidence that omitting the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466764

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye - 2003

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468885

The Trouble with Stock Options

Hall, Brian J. - 2003

that we believe explains the over-use of options and several apparent puzzles: boards and managers falsely perceive stock …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468914

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye - 2002

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469645

Managing Option Fragility

Hall, Brian J. - 2002

We analyze and explore option fragility, the notion that option incentives are fragile due to their non-linear payoff structure. Option incentives become weaker as options fall underwater, leading to pressures to reprice options or restore incentives through additional grants of equity-based...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469654