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Hansen, Stephen; Ramdas, Tejas; Sadun, Raffaella; … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021

We use a unique corpus of job descriptions for C-suite positions to document skills requirements in top managerial occupations across a large sample of firms. A novel algorithm maps the text of each executive search into six separate skill clusters reflecting cognitive, interpersonal, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585443

Communication within Firms : Evidence from CEO Turnovers

Impink, Stephen Michael; Prat, Andrea; Sadun, Raffaella - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021

This paper uses novel, firm-level measures derived from communications metadata before and after a CEO transition in 102 firms to study if CEO turnover impacts employees' communication flows. We find that CEO turnover leads to an initial decrease in intra-firm communication, followed by a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012599332

The Impact of CEOs in the Public Sector : Evidence from the English NHS

Janke, Katharina - 2019

We investigate whether top managers affect the performance of large and complex public sector organizations, using as a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479802

How Do CEOs Make Strategy?

Yang, Mu-Jeung - 2020

We explore the critical question of how executives make strategic decisions. Utilizing a new survey of 262 CEO alumni of Harvard Business School, we gather evidence on four aspects of each executive's business strategy: its overall structure, its formalization, its development, and its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012482172

CEO Centrality

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2007

We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality -- the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power -- and the value and behavior of public firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five compensation captured...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464945

Lucky Directors

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2006

While prior empirical work and much public attention have focused on the opportunistic timing of executives' grants, we provide in this paper evidence that outside directors' option grants have also been favorably timed to an extent that cannot be fully explained by sheer luck. Examining events...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465848

Lucky CEOs

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2006

We study the relation between corporate governance and opportunistic timing of CEO option grants via backdating or otherwise. Our methodology focuses on how grant date prices rank within the price distribution of the grant month. During 1996-2005, about 12% of firms provided one or more lucky...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465890

Executive Pensions

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2005

Because public firms are not required to disclose the monetary value of pension plans in their executive pay disclosures, financial economists have generally analyzed executive pay using figures that do not include the value of such pension plans. This paper presents evidence that omitting the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466764

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye - 2003

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468885

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye - 2002

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469645