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Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2007

We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality -- the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power -- and the value and behavior of public firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five compensation captured...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464945

Lucky Directors

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2006

While prior empirical work and much public attention have focused on the opportunistic timing of executives' grants, we provide in this paper evidence that outside directors' option grants have also been favorably timed to an extent that cannot be fully explained by sheer luck. Examining events...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465848

Lucky CEOs

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2006

We study the relation between corporate governance and opportunistic timing of CEO option grants via backdating or otherwise. Our methodology focuses on how grant date prices rank within the price distribution of the grant month. During 1996-2005, about 12% of firms provided one or more lucky...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465890

Executive Pensions

Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2005

Because public firms are not required to disclose the monetary value of pension plans in their executive pay disclosures, financial economists have generally analyzed executive pay using figures that do not include the value of such pension plans. This paper presents evidence that omitting the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466764

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye - 2003

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468885

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye - 2002

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469645

Executive Compensation in America : Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents?

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye - 2001

This paper develops an account of the role and significance of rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting view of executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470054

Promotions and the Peter Principle

Benson, Alan - 2018

The best worker is not always the best candidate for manager. In these cases, do firms promote the best potential manager or the best worker in her current job? Using microdata on the performance of sales workers at 214 firms, we find evidence consistent with the "Peter Principle," which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012453371

How do Quasi-Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk-Taking?

Shue, Kelly - 2017

We examine how an increase in stock option grants affects CEO risk-taking. The overall net effect of option grants is theoretically ambiguous for risk-averse CEOs. To overcome the endogeneity of option grants, we exploit institutional features of multi-year compensation plans, which generate two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455590

Growth through Rigidity : An Explanation for the Rise in CEO Pay

Shue, Kelly - 2016

The dramatic rise in CEO compensation during the 1990s and early 2000s is a longstanding puzzle. In this paper, we show that much of the rise can be explained by a tendency of firms to grant the same number of options each year. Number-rigidity implies that the grant-date value of option awards...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456699