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Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies.
Krishna, V.; Rosenthal, R.W. - Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University - 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005777067
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The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis.
Benoit, J.P.; Krishna, V. - Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University - 1996
The theory of repeated games occupies a central place in noncooperative game theory as it forms a relatively simple …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005631436
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Incentive Compatible Information Transfer Between Asymmetrically Informed Principals.
Bond, E.W.; Gresik, T.A. - Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University - 1998
In this paper, the authors use a model of tax competition to study the role of information sharing in common agency problems.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005631513
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N-Person Bargaining and Strategic Complexity.
Chatterjee, K.; Sabourian, S. - Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University - 1999
We investigate the effect of introducing costs of complexity in the N-person unaimity bargaining game.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005631530
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Competition Between Asymmetrically Informed Principals.
Bond, E.W.; Gresik; T.A. - Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University - 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478667
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On the Convergence of Ficticious Play.
Sjostrom, T.; Krishna, V. - Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University - 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478724