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Shareholder-value maximization and tacit collusion
Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 1998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000987470
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Debt as a (credible) collusive device
Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 1998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000987481
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Ownership, control, and collusion
Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 1998 - Rev
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000993547
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Ownership, control, taxation, and collusion
Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 1996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000953959
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Executive Compensation : A Survey of Theory and Evidence
Edmans, Alex - 2017
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455086
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Risk and the CEO Market : Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs?
Edmans, Alex - 2010
This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and heterogeneous moral hazard. Each of the three outcomes can be summarized by a single closed-form equation. In assignment models without moral hazard, allocation depends only on firm size...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462666
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Executive Compensation and Incentives : The Impact of Takeover Legislation
Bertrand, Marianne - 1998
We investigate the impact of changes in states' anti-takeover legislation on executive compensation. We find both pay for performance sensitivities and mean pay increase for the firms affected by the legislation (relative to a control group). These findings are partially consistent with an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471981
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Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives
Benmelech, Efraim - 2008
Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely …-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464915
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Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns : Theory and Evidence
Gibbons, Robert - 1991
This paper studies career concerns -- concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation -- and describes how optimal incentive contracts are affected when career concerns are taken into account. Career concerns arise frequently: they occur whenever the market uses a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012475208
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Affiliation, Integration, and Information : Ownership Incentives and Industry Structure
Hubbard, Thomas N. - 2001
This paper presents theory and evidence on horizontal industry structure, focusing on situations where plant …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470424